STI Conference Aalborg

- 15 16 November 2013
- 151215 and 161115
- Hotel Hvide Hus, Aalborg
- Gaesteasalen
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"Experience is the best teacher but the wisest learn from the experience of others."

Origin Unknown















Marine Accidents Lessons Learned

John Lang

President of

Association of Sail Training Organisations





A Mariner's reaction to an Accident

- Oh no!
- There for the Grace of God......
- What on earth happened?
- How did it happen?
- It couldn't possible happen to me.....
- Or could it? What can we learn from it
- So what were the lessons?

By those involved

- Oh no!
- Do I tell someone or can I get away with it?
- It wasn't really my fault. Rogue wave; the other person was responsible; it was one of those things.
- Personal trauma
- Litigation, prosecution or a bad press

Management's reaction

- We must know what happened
- Do we know exactly who was on board?
- Focus on saving life
- · Tell the right people what has happened
- Activate disaster response plan
- Focus on the positive
- Have press line prepared.

"As another sail training ship goes down, is this a worrying trend?"

- What is it about training ships that seem to attract disaster? In the past few years we've had the loss of the Irish sail training vessel Asgard, Gipsy Moth's disastrous stranding in the Pacific, the capsize of the Canadian square rigger Concordia off Brazil and now the loss of the Lord Rank.
- It does make you wonder if there is enough supervision on training boats.

Elaine Bunting. "Yachting Monthly"









A Volunteer Please

A Scribe!

 How many of you are active sail trainers – both full and part timers?

• Of the active sail trainers how many are full, or part time, skippers?

• Of the sail trainers (not just skippers) how many have ever been involved in a serious accident – including having a fatality on board?

• How many have been involved in a less serious accident – one that led to someone being injured, or repairs that required a claim on an insurance policy?


• How many of you have been in a situation that frightened you stupid but didn't have a serious outcome in other words you got away with it?

This time please keep your hands up

Question 6 For those who have their hands up

- Following on from the last question please put your hands down if, after a near miss, you or someone else, reported the incident to the parent company.
- Those who didn't keep your hands up.

• Hands up if you belong to an organisation where there is no system for discussing accidents or incidents – either your own or someone else's.





Accidents

- Are never caused by a single event.
- They are caused by several things going wrong over time.
- The origins of any accident may well have occurred many months, and even years, beforehand.







The Aalborg 5 letter System

ABCDE

A

Assume

C

Complacency

D

Distraction

E

Eyes

BAD WEATHER TACTICS Shipmasters of old

• "A ship's survival depended almost solely on the competence of the master and on his constant alertness to every change in the weather. There was no one to tell him that the time had now come to strike his light sails and spars, and snug her down under close reefs and storm trysails. His own barometer, the force and direction of the wind, and the appearance of sea and sky were all that he had for information. Ceaseless vigilance in watching and interpreting signs, plus a philosophy of taking no risk in which there was little to gain and much to be lost, was what enabled him to survive."



B

Blame





Seafarers are 'easy targets' in today's knee-jerk blame culture says Rhodin

of a silk handkerchief in London might have ended in a to cause mayhem. sentence of transportation to Australia.

Naturally, the norms of crime and punishment change with the times, but it is dangerous to assume that modern society always displays a more humane sense of balance. In the maritime context, for example, there is a growing view that the mere presence of an individual at the scene of an accident may constitute a "crime".

Lars Rhodin, deputy managing director of The Swedish Club, says: "No ship's master harbours a secret desire to spill thousands of tonnes of oil or chemicals over the nearest coastline. Yet some administrations now behave as though those caught up in a genuine accident have crew, together with the sal-

IN FORMER times the theft acted recklessly or even set out with the deliberate intent

"Seafarers are easy targets. They also have their uses as decoys whenever errors of judgement are made by others, such as politicians and bureaucrats.

Greece. As for the Tasman

"It is easy to understand how the unfortunate drift towards criminalisation took hold. Concern over the disastrous impact of severe spills, such as the Prestige, increased the pressure on the political front. The results are evident in two notable cases - the Prestige and Tasman Spirit. In the former punishment at that. case, Captain Mangouras remains trapped in Spain, awaiting trial and unable to return home to his family in

vage master, were held in detention in Pakistan for some

"We are at risk of losing our perspective on the difference between prevention and ishment. In a spill situation, compensation is designed to restore the position

those parties suffering loss. Action against the commercial interests involved may well have a preventive element, in that the penalties include a component aimed at deterrence, so as to avoid similar accidents in the fu-Yet, we have now moved firmly into the realms of punishment - and harsh

"Traditionally, sanctions, in terms of penalties, were directed at companies rather than individuals, but there Spirit, seven members of the appears to be a growing view that this is not enough. Indi-

viduals must be targeted and punished, as it is impossible to send a company to prison. It is specious, however, to argue that the only way forward is to threaten individuals with financial penalties and/or a custodial sentence.'

Mr Rhodin believes criminalisation generates new risks. He says: "There are real worries, on both safety and environmental counts. A hostile, uncompromising attitude on the part of an administration may lead to delays in responding when an emergency occurs. Owners may be reluctant to send personnel to the scene of an accident if they risk being detained. Salvors may be reluctant to get involved if their personnel and vessels are subject to

Some shore authorities may also fail to strike an ap-

propriate balance in respect of the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code. Mr Rhodin explains: "It would be unfortunate if it were to become 'politically incorrect' to offer frank comment on ISPS. Certainly, there is no room for complacency in this area. The terrorist attack on the tanker Limburg makes the point.

"At the same time, do we really have to go to such an extreme that innocent seafarers are denied a few hours' shore leave? Seafarers are not robots. They require rest and time ashore if they are to remain fresh and fit to meet their demanding shipboard responsibilities.

"It would seem that, in this war against terror and the struggle to avoid another Prestige, some jurisdictions are more inclined to presume

Criminalising of seafarers 'may hinder investigations'

THE chief executive of the London Club says continued ers are hindering the indusrobust and vigorous accident

Paul Hinton believes the efforts of international governments to prosecute seafarers for incidents and accidents is whereby investigations are being hindered amid fears that crews will be punished or every error they make.

He says: "We, as with every P&I club, would fully support any action taken against vesels and crews which wantonous or illegal manner

dards are improving, where I feel we are falling down is the act that we do not have an acident investigation regime at the level of that used in the viation market.'

Mr Hinton fears the reason s the continuing move to crinot only driving talented

crews away from the industry but also breeding an environ-says. "There has been talk but also breeding an environ-ment where there are coverups by crews which fear pros "We have a choice," he say

"The priority can be towards making the victims feel better after they have become victims, or we can look at how we investigate incidents thor-oughly and then disseminate those findings so that we can learn from those errors ed - thereby avoiding victims in the first place. We are moving towards criminalisation and it is promoting cover-

Mr Hinton says that on the whole the market is in a positive state with stable rates systems which will enhance

However, he adds, P&I clubs cannot be seen as pseudo-classification societies the clubs' agenda and structure are different

"We do not have the huge scale of operations enjoyed by our role."

that the P&I clubs have sought to take on such a role out that is not the case

Ship standards are for th classification societies. The work the clubs have been doing is really to fill in th gaps classifications have left. "Take hatches for example

The classification societie want to ensure that they are able to stop a ship from sink-ing and will not be too bothered if there is minor leakage around the seals.

"However, for the P&I club it is that leakage that can ensure that the risk manage numbers and level of claim are in place. We are looking at

"If you take the Prestige, the authorities were looking for those they could hold responsible and sought to treat

Letter to the Editor

No-blame analysis is best for safety at sea

From Rear Adm John Lang

SIR, Few would argue that the most effective measures to improve safety of life at sea owe their origins to casualty investigations where the emphasis is placed on establishing what happened and why rather than trying to find someone to blame. All too often the search for a culprit, especially when there is loss of life or substantial environmental damage, leads to investigations that completely lose sight of the main aim, which should be to prevent the same thing happening again.

As more than one P&I club and marine insurer is discovering, the underlying cause of too many accidents today is human failure. All too often this failure is being categorised as 'human error' with seemingly little effort being made to establish the underlying causes. Thankfully the handful of independent marine accident investigation organisations, and the International Maritime Organization, are doing their best to probe the human factors that lie behind such mistakes.

It therefore follows that responsible flag administrations can do much to improve safety at sea by thoroughly investigating any incident that involves the human factor. Being able to do so in circumstances where there is no loss of life or environmental damage is an immense advantage as it enables the investigations to progress without the distraction of either the media or vested interests trying to duck

Tragically, there are too many examples where such investigations are not carried out. Fear of publicity, shallow arguments that publication of any findings might compromise judicial proceedings or the perceived apportionment of liability, tend to be the dominant sentiment in deciding

Every so often, however, an accident occurs where the human element is so obviously a key factor that it becomes imperative that as thorough an investigation as possible be conducted.

In the early hours of December 8, 2007 such an accident occurred.

A few miles to the east of the Bab el Mandep Traffic Separation Scheme and in the Gulf of Aden, the 2006-built Panamanian registered containership MSC Prestige collided, bow-to-bow, with the 2007built French-flagged crude oil tanker Samco Europe. As the Lloyd's List casualty reports emphasised, there were no injuries and no pollution. To the world it might have seemed to be a minor incident but, in practice, it was a particularly severe collision as the two ships impacted at an angle of about 90° with an unusually high expenditure of kinetic energy. Both vessels sustained substantial damage. Had the collision occurred five seconds sooner or later, it would have been among the most

Visibility was good, both ships were fitted with working radars and ARPA, and both altered course in the minutes before the accident. Both were fitted with Voyage Data Recorders. Provided the two investigating flag states, Panama and France, cooperate fully, establishing precisely what happened will be relatively straightforward. Finding out why it happened will be the more difficult challenge

It appears, however, that while France was all too ready to carry out an investigation (Lloyds List, December 13, 2007), in the immediate aftermath the Panamanian Maritime Authority has shown a distinct reluctance to do likewise.

Should the two states fail to co-operate in the manner advocated by the IMO, then a golden opportunity to establish why two well-equipped ships collided in the manner they did, will be lost. It is in the interests of all that this accident be properly investigated and the findings published.

Failure to do so will ensure that it could, and probably will, happen again. John Lang, Rear Admiral

Martyr Worthy Winchester Hampshire



Pilots admit to falling asleep while in the air

The captain and his co-pilot on the packed 325-seat airbus A330 had decided to take turns in having 20-minute naps during the journey on August 13.

But less than two hours after take-off, both were reportedly asleep, leaving the plane cruising on autopilot with no-one to take control in the event of an emergency.









